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19th century mass migrations drove some 55 million Europeans to the New World in search of 
a better life (Hatton and Williamson 1998). The magnitude of migratory flow has been 
unprecedented in history. This has been possible due to a conjuncture of events such as the 
transport cost revolution, a sharp rise in population growth in the old world and labor scarcity 
in the New World, as documented well in the literature (Hatton and Williamson 1998, Cohn 
2009, Balderas and Greenwood 2010). Only recently, however, the skill selectivity of these 
migrants has shifted to the centre of attention to scholars (Cohn 2009, Murtin and Viarengo 
2010, Stolz and Baten 2011). Evidence that allows measuring the impact of selective 
migration on destination country’s economies is therefore a clear research desideratum. The 
human capital which migrants incorporate, their individual skill-set, is an important channel 
through which migration can have persistent effects on destination country’s economic 
prosperity. Human capital includes formal education, but also entrepreneurial spirit and 
motivation. These capabilities and skills will not be applied in the home country’s economy, 
but in the economy of the receiving nation. Selective migration can have persistent effects on 
the process of human capital accumulation of receiving nations and thus for economic growth 
in general. The direction of this effect depends very much on how immigrants compare to the 
destination country’s population. In this context, research providing long-run data on human 
capital endowment of both migrants and native population is particularly important, as it 
sheds light on the long-term relationships, persistence and path-dependency of these 
processes. 
This article provides new evidence on Brazilian human capital formation in the very 
long-run, from the early 18th to the 20th centuries. Furthermore, we collected new data on 
human capital endowment of 19th century migrants to Brazil, whose educational level was 
higher than that of native Brazilians. We use the age-heaping method (Mokyr 1983, A’Hearn, 
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Baten and Crayen 2010), which provides a numeracy indicator particularly suitable for early 
stages of human capital formation. It exploits the tendency of less educated people to round 
their age instead of stating an exact age. Numeracy is highly correlated with other human 
capital output indicators such as literacy. Its main determinant is schooling investments 
(Crayen and Baten 2009). We argue that - apart from the migratory transfer of skills - the 
relatively high human capital levels of immigrants induced spillover effects to overall 
Brazilian human capital endowment which persistently enhanced economic growth in Brazil. 
Endogenous growth theory states a theoretical relationship between human capital 
development and economic growth (Lucas 1988, Romer 1994, amongst many others). Testing 
this relationship empirically is complex. Capolupo (2009) and others (for example, Cohen and 
Soto 2007) show that the impact of human capital might have even been underestimated in 
previous research due to a lack of consistent and long-run data on human capital. In this study 
we are interested in the long term impact of human capital formation on economic 
performance. Does 19th century human capital development still impact growth performance 
today? In a cross-section of 90 countries, we show that numeracy levels in 1900 have a 
significant impact on real GDP per capita in the year 2000, even after controlling for a set of 
control variables and after instrumenting numeracy to cope with potential endogeneity and 
measurement error. That means countries which already performed well in terms of human 
capital around the year 1900, still have a high real GDP per capita in the year 2000, whereas 
countries which performed badly in terms of numeracy around 1900, today are situated more 
at the bottom of the global income distribution. This exercise provides some evidence, that 
human capital endowment a hundred years ago still impacts growth performance today.  
In a counterfactual, we show that the effect of migratory human capital transfer has 
also an economic impact. For illustration, consider that in the year 2002, 44 million Brazilians 
received between 50 and 95 Brazilian Reais per month to amend their subsistence with the 
“Fome Zero” program initiated by President Lula da Silva.1 For illustration: the effect is 
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larger than one of these payments, namely around 75 US $ or somewhat over 130 Reais. This 
would be the estimated magnitude of the persistent human capital effect on today’s income 
that selective mass migrations around the turn of the last century still has.  
When it comes to 19th century mass migrations, mainly the destinations of North 
America and Argentina have been at the centre of scholarly attention (Hatton and Williamson 
1998). The Brazilian experience has somewhat been neglected, although it received over 4.1 
million immigrants between its independence in 1822 and 1926, ranking after the US and 
Argentina among the top three most favorite immigration countries during the era of mass 
migrations (Ferenczi and Willcox, 1929, important exceptions are, for example, Klein 1995, 
Balderas and Greenwood 2010). Brazil was the last country in the Western World to abolish 
slavery.Consequently the demand for immigrant labor on the plantations of the thriving 
coffee sector created an immigrant flow that was attracted to a large extent by favorable 
immigration policies of the Brazilian government which paid passages or granted access to 
land. Also owners of large coffee plantations were willing to pay the travel costs for 
immigrants and their families, who then worked off their debts on the plantations.For Brazil 
it was necessary to be financially attractive, because the country had to compete with 
Argentina and the US, whose economies provided higher income per capita and hence higher 
wage gaps in relation to European source countries. This created stronger pull forces to these 
economies than to Brazil (Holloway 1980, Stolcke 1988). 
The article is structured as follows: in the next chapter, we clarify the relation between 
human capital formation, selective migration and economic growth. We also propose possible 
channels via which human capital spillovers could have taken place. In the next section we 
review the literature on human capital formation in Brazil since the 18th century. Then, we 
introduce and discuss the data. The following section displays our regression results and the 
counterfactual. In a separate section, we look at regional human capital distribution and 
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immigration, and verify whether high absolute immigration in a state generally correlate with 
numeracy increases. We end with a conclusion. 
 
Economic Growth, Human Capital Formation, and International Migration  
Human capital plays a central role in endogenous growth theories. Generally, there exist three 
broad strands of literature. Lucas (1988) and others have provided models that incorporate 
human capital as a separate factor that becomes the driving force for economic growth. An 
additive recent strand of literature puts the process of knowledge creation via innovation and 
R&D into the centre of attention (Grossman & Helpman, 1991; for a comprehensive survey of 
the topic see Drinkwater et al 2003). All of these approaches have been applied to the field of 
international migration to answer the question of how migration affects economic growth in 
the long run. Central to these approaches is the assumption that migrants become a part of the 
destination country’s human capital stock, which then affects economic performance. 
Empirical studies using one of these models commonly conclude that international migration 
can affect economic growth through the skill composition of migrants which they apply in the 
destinations’ labor market (Reichlin and Rustichini 1993, Lundborg and Segerstrom 2000, 
2002 as in Drinkwater et al 2003).2 In destination countries, the question is whether migrants 
are high or low skilled and how they compare to natives.3 Although migration is typically not 
included in growth regressions, there exists evidence from the field of economic history that 
international migration induces growth effects in receiving nations for the case of Argentina 
(Taylor 1997). Taylor uses a Computable General Equilibrium Model to capture the effects of 
migration on the Argentinean economy during the age of mass migration. He finds that 
immigration causes a significant increase in GDP. 4 However, the outcome of the analysis is 
very sensitive to initial assumptions of a variety of model parameters that have to be chosen 
or estimated beforehand.  
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Recently, the Brazilian case of the state of São Paulo has been investigated by 
Carvalho Filho and Colistete (2010). Based on historical data from agricultural censuses and 
education statistics, these authors find a positive and enduring effect of the presence of 
foreign born immigrants on the supply of public instruction, as well as negative effects of land 
concentration. 
In this study, we quantify the long-term impact of selective migration on human 
capital formation and economic growth in Brazil. Human capital formation is a highly 
persistent and path dependent process. Looking at numeracy levels in the year 1900 versus 
higher educational attainment of the total population provided by Barro and Lee (2001) 
(Figure 1), we find a strong positive relationship. Both are indicators of human capital, 
however, while numeracy captures a basic form of human capital, the latter is an indicator 
suitable for economies today, capturing a very advanced form of human capital, namely 
average years of higher schooling in the total population. It is evident that countries 
performing poorly in terms of human capital in the year 1900, like Egypt or Bangladesh, are 
still underperforming in the year 2000. On the other hand, countries like the US or Japan, 
which already had solved their numeracy problem around 1900, are among the top-performers 
in the year 2000 (Figure 2). The graph shows the path dependency of human capital formation 
in the very long run. Due to this path dependency, and the theoretical relation of economic 
growth and human capital, we would also expect the long-run relationship between early 
human capital formation and economic output to hold.  
We first estimate the effect of human capital endowment in the year 1900 measured 
with age heaping techniques on log GDP per capita in the year 2000, controlling for a set of 
geographical and institutional variables.5 In a next step, we calculate a counterfactual, 
assuming that the migrants’ human capital had not arrived in Brazil, to assess whether there 
are any economically important long-term effects. In a next section, we look at regional 
dispersion of human capital and correlate this with immigration statistics, to find out, whether 
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human capital enhancing effects took place mainly in the Brazilian states which were also 
predominantly destinations for the immigrants. This would give further support to the 
hypothesis that the human capital of migrants produced spillover effects to the overall 
Brazilian human capital formation. 
Through which channels does the human capital of migrants affect economic growth? 
Migrants take their human capital endowment with them, which comprises their crude 
manpower, but also entrepreneurial spirit, innovative ideas and motivation, as well as formal 
and informal education and training. Migrants are not a random sample of the source country 
population (Todaro 1969, Hatton and Williamson 1998, 2008). Positive or negative selection 
in terms of formal education, relative to the source country’s populations highly depends on 
skill premia or relative inequality of source and destination countries (Borjas 1994, Stolz and 
Baten 2011). It has been argued in the literature that the great majority of migrants however, 
are positively selected in terms of their willingness to take risks, entrepreneurial spirit and 
motivation. This leads to four channels, via which the migrants’ human capital induces 
positive spillover effects to destination countries’ human capital stock: 
The first channel is a sheer level effect: 19th century immigrants exhibited a formal and 
informal education and training that was better than that of native Brazilians. The immigrants 
stemmed from societies that already had implemented school systems and provided 
compulsory formal education for most children (with the exception of Middle Eastern 
immigrants). They were also better trained for tasks in factories due to earlier industrialization 
in their home countries. Even though it is true that immigrants often were less educated than 
the people staying in Europe (Klein 1995), they often were more educated than native 
Brazilians (Merrick & Graham 1979), a fact that is supported by our data. Merrick and 
Graham (1979) state, in terms of literacy, that the average education level of immigrants was 
higher than that of native born Brazilians. They estimate that migrants had twice the literacy 
rate and three times the level of secondary and higher education than the native population.6 
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The first channel might therefore be simply the higher education of migrants compared to the 
destination country’s population.  
The second channel is related to entrepreneurship. Campos Araújo and his co-authors 
(2006) stress analogies between the mindset of an entrepreneur and a migrant. The motivation 
to start a new life in a geographically and culturally remote target country is very similar to 
the willingness to risk and the ambition to start a new business. Also, immigrants are often 
driven to engage in entrepreneurial activities because of restrictive labor markets. Particularly 
in 19th and early 20th century Brazil, where there was no social security system whatsoever, 
immigrants had to start their own businesses to survive if they were not working on 
plantations or in manufacturing, or after they had paid off their debt of assisted passages to the 
plantation owners. Most of them successfully did so. For example, by 1934, over 40 percent 
of the coffee production in São Paulo was produced by the 14.5 percent foreign population of 
the state, which shows that, as Baer (2001) states, the immigrants were “economically 
ambitious people”. Additionally, if immigrants wanted to maintain their cultural identity and 
lifestyle and consume the services and products they were accustomed to, they had to produce 
them, provide them or initiate trade with the home country to obtain them. This channel 
would induce trade, craftsmanship and employment in both immigrant communities and 
among the native population.  
A third possible channel could be human capital spillovers from migrant human 
capital to the local population. The higher education of immigrants could spill over to the 
native population as they initiated successful behavior. Immigrants built their own schools, 
hospitals and charitable institutions, in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Klein 1995). These 
institutions were channels through which the native population might have enjoyed greater 
access to education and social care. Schwartzman and Brock (2003) also state that German, 
Italian, and Japanese immigrants created their own schools, sometimes with the support of the 
governments of their countries of origin, or foreign priests.  
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In the Brazilian case, one has to bear in mind that the majority of the migrants arrived 
in the great cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo via the ports where they disembarked the 
steamships after their journey across the Atlantic. They mainly went to the center and the 
southern part of Brazil (Klein 1995). Hence, human capital spillovers would have 
predominantly taken place in and around these areas with high immigrant concentration, 
which is particularly strong in the São Paulo region due to the rise in the coffee industry. 
After 1880 around 70 percent of all immigrants arrived here (Merrick & Graham 1979). This 
uneven distribution of immigrant human capital spillovers might have contributed, at least 
partly, to the regional inequality in human capital that persists today. In 1924, the Associação 
Brasileira de Educação was established in Rio de Janeiro with members from different 
nations and played a very important role in bringing education on the national agenda (Paim 
1981 as in Schwartzman and Brock 2003). Later human capital formation has, due to the 
country’s colonial legacy, a long history, which we will now study in detail. 
Finally, a fourth channel for spill over might be the fact that female human capital has 
positive implications for intergenerational transfer. The migration experience sometimes 
increases the relative importance of female human capital, because families might not keep 
their traditional gender roles as tightly as in the case of stayers. Moreover, in particular the 
basic numeracy that we measure with age-heaping method is a component of education which 
is taught primarily in the household during the first years of life. More self-confident migrant 
mothers might actually be able to improve this important component of human capital, even if 
school attendance (and hence literacy) might be not equally developed. In other words, while 
both education in school and in the household is important for numeracy, the latter might be 




Human Capital Formation in Brazil 1700-1940: what do we know? 
Baer (2001) argues that there was virtually no formal education in Brazil prior to the late 18th 
century, except for some regionally scattered efforts of Jesuits. They were expulsed from the 
country in 1759, after conflicts with the new minister Marquis of Pombal. The Portuguese 
crown was in need of resources to reconstruct Lisbon after the devastating earthquake in 
1755, which is why it confiscated the assets of the fraternity (Oliveira Marques, 1986). Even 
later, the few existing schools had little impact on the cultural level of the population as a 
whole, because the schools were understaffed and the teachers poorly paid (Prado Júnior, 
1959). Carvalho (1982) stresses that Portugal, as a colonial power, refused systematically to 
allow the organization of any institution of higher learning in its colonies. In 1768, he further 
mentions the Concelho Ultramarino which was the administrative institution which dealt with 
overseas issues, denied a request of the captaincy of Minas Gerais to build a school of 
medicine. Only after 1808, when the Portuguese court fled to Rio de Janeiro due to the 
Napoleonic invasion in Portugal, two medical and two military academies were allowed in 
Brazil. But not only was higher learning severely underdeveloped, also, and more 
importantly, mass education was lacking. Schwartzman and Brock (2003) state that by 1794 
only 179 appointed professional teachers existed in Brazil, whereas in the small country of 
Portugal the number was around 748. Martinéz-Fritscher, Musacchio and Viarengo (2009) 
repeat that around a century later, in 1890, Brazil still had one of the lowest levels of literacy 
in Latin America. Only around 15 percent of the population were able to read and write. 
Schwartzman and Brock (2003) also argue that throughout the First Republic (1889-1930), 
primary and secondary education remained the responsibility of local and state governments, 
and only about 25% of the population, at most, were literate. Large problems in this context 
were regional disparities in education. In 1834, the responsibility for education was assigned 
to the provincial governments and for several years the central government subsidized poorer 
provinces. However, in 1845 these subsidies were abolished and some provinces were unable 
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to provide an adequate schooling system. As a consequence, the number of children enrolled 
in public schools declined (Barman 1994, p. 242). These financial difficulties fostered 
regional disparities within Brazil even more. Most of the improvement in education during the 
late 19th century took place in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo or the more prosperous southern 
regions while the northeast fell behind (Lewis 2006, p.125). These regions are also the ones 
that received most immigrants during the turn of the centuries. Martinéz-Fritscher et al. 
(2009) find that educational development was associated with trade and commerce, as states 
that received export tax revenues invested them in schooling and education. However, they do 
not account for immigration at the state level. We find numeracy improvements exactly in 
those states to be associated with knowledge spillover effects of international immigration. 
Given the fact, that between 1772 and 1900 almost one fourth of all population growth is due 
to immigration, it is quite plausible that human capital formation in Brazil was influenced by 
immigrant’s human capital. Baer (2001) even argues that public investment in immigration 
had been a sensible, potent substitute for investing in education.  
 
Data 
We use the age-heaping approach to proxy early human capital formation in Brazil. Age-
heaping exploits the fact that people living in societies at early stage of human capital 
formation typically tend to round their age to convenient multiples of five instead of reporting 
their exact age (see Crayen and Baten 2009). The share of multiples of five to other numbers 
in the age distribution is expressed in the Whipple Index (A’Hearn, Baten, Crayen 2010). In 
this study, we apply the ABCC-Index, which is a linear transformation of the latter. It ranges 
between 0 and 100, where zero stands for an age distribution where everybody states a 
rounded age and 100 represents no heaping at all. Its coherent construction allows 
comparability over space and time and different data sources (Crayen and Baten 2009, 
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Manzel, Baten and Stolz 2011). In recent studies, the indicator has proven very valuable in a 
wide range of topics in human capital research (see, for example Humphries and Leunig 2009, 
Stolz and Baten 2011, Prayon and Baten, 2010, for details, also see the internet appendix on 
the methodology age heaping). For a society at that early stage of human capital formation, 
the age heaping approach is a suitable indicator to proxy human capital. Usually, societies 
reach higher numeracy values before they reach better levels of literacy, as knowing one’s 
exact age is a basic skill compared to reading and writing. One of the major determinants of 
numeracy is, of course, schooling investments as a major input to mass education (Crayen & 
Baten 2009). However, we should acknowledge some scholars being sceptic about the age 
heaping methodology, because it is a more indirect indicator of human capital then, say, 
literacy. Especially the question should be posed whether the introduction of birth registers, 
the number of censuses and other bureaucratic procedures might increase the knowledge of 
one´s age, but not the education. Age heaping might measure, apart from numeracy, also 
family stability, the development of local civil government, the spread of vital registration, for 
example. For example, there is clearly a correlation with vital registration. But previous 
studies actually found that the residual of regressions of age heaping on schooling investments 
are not correlated with vital registration and other bureaucratic innovations (Crayen and Baten 
2009). For example, the UK had vital registration since the 17th century and developed local 
government during the 18th and 19th centuries, but as late as 1851 and 1881, age heaping was 
still particularly strong in the UK. The advantage of age statements is that people did take it 
serious, but not sufficiently serious to go to the parish priest and counter-check with birth 
registers. In fact, in world wide comparison, numeracy correlates with the number of censuses 
and the introduction of birth registers. However Crayen and Baten have found in a regression 
of numeracy on school enrolment and the number of censuses, only the former has a 





To estimate the Brazilian numeracy trend, we use census data from five consecutive censuses, 
1772, 1830, 1890, 1920 and 1950. For the first time, it is possible to extend the trend back to 
the very beginning of the 18th century, a period where quantitative data has been scarce so far. 
One census executed in the region of Sorocaba (São Paulo) in 1772 provides data for the birth 
cohorts 1700-1740. This is the earliest enumeration of the region analyzed in a quantitative 
study, so far. It has survived in the Ultramarino Historical Archive of Lisbon. Almost the 
entire São Paulo region was enumerated. We took a sample of 6,278 observations for this 
study.8  
Unfortunately, there is no information on age statements of slaves or ethnic 
background of the free population, so we do not know anything about the ethnic composition 
of the sample. However, knowing that only free people are included in this enumeration, we 
had to adjust it, to secure comparability with the other sources, which all contain data on free 
and enslaved people. To this end, we looked at the Sorocaba district in the later, 1830 
evidence, containing data on slaves and free people and we calculated the difference of slave 
and free ABCC levels, weighted by the number of observations. With this value, we corrected 
the Sorocaba 1772 evidence to make it comparable to our other sources.  
Next, the 1830 evidence refers to enumerations in the states of Paraná, São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais. For Minas Gerais, there are two very important series of nominative lists: one 
for 1831-32 and another one for 1838-40. These sets of documents were processed by 
researchers of the Center of Regional Development and Planning, of the Federal University of 
Minas Gerais (CEDEPLAR/FACE/UFMG).9 They are the result of attempts at producing 
general censuses in the provinces and were organized by justices of the peace (the lowest 
judicial authority in post-colonial Brazil), and were commissioned by the Provincial 
Government. The lists of 1831-32 were used because they comprehend a larger share of the 
population of Minas Gerais at the time. They contain information about 234 out of the 410 
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districts (the territory under the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace) of the province, covering 
57% of all localities. The data base contains 491,017 inhabitants, 356,267 (72.6%) of them 
were free and 134,750 (27.4%) were slaves, corresponding to approximately 71% of the 
estimated total population of the province for the first half of the 1830 decade. The 
nominative lists of inhabitants of São Paulo (that included the present state of Paraná) are part 
of a more substantial set of documents called Maços de População. These lists give us a large 
volume of information on the population of the province. The lists of 1836, which we use 
here, are the last link of a chain of assessments of data on the population, which started to be 
compiled in 1765. All the lists of the 38 municipalities of São Paulo have been assessed. The 
data base contains 257,751 inhabitants, 181,849 (70.6%) of them being free and 75,902 
(29.4%) being slaves, corresponding to around 79% of the total population of the province. It 
contains regional data on both sexes and also on their status, i.e. slaves and free people, which 
is why we consider it to be representative at least for the southern areas of Brazil. 
The later samples of the 1890 and 1950 nationwide censuses are representative of the 
entire Brazilian population per definition. Only the 1920 census might contain an upward bias 
due to enumerating strictly the district capitals and not the rural areas of the districts.10 
To which degree are the early samples biased? Before the coffee boom and the large 
migration waves set in after the 1870s, the Southeast region did not have a reputation for 
being well-developed compared to the Brazilian average (except the urban Federal District of 
Rio de Janeiro), unlike the South. We can compare the regional numeracy for the birth decade 
of the 1830s. In this decade, the ABCC indexes in São Paulo and Minas Gerais were some 3 
percent below the national average, whereas the one on Paraná was some 3 percent above the 
national average. Assuming similar regional differences for the inhabitants in the 1830 
population lists, the slight negative regional bias cannot be very pronounced (around minus 1 
percent). For the 1772 census, in which only São Paulo is represented, it might be of the order 
of a 3 percent negative bias (i.e., the Brazilian national figure might be even higher). A new 
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source of evidence even allows us to countercheck for the early modern period, whether the 
south was initially less numerate than the north. We look for regional differences in the 
earliest period using inquisition files of the Portuguese Sanctum Officium which include a 
sufficiently large number of cases with age-statements of the involved Brazilians from all 
parts of the country.11 If we adjust the 1920 census which contains only provincial capitals, 
downward by 4 percent, the values for the birth decades of the 1860s and 1890s would also be 
identical to the respective birth decades in the censuses of 1890 and 1950.  
Our numeracy estimates for Brazil during the 18th and 19th century are arranged by 
birth decade averages and allow us to shed light on human capital formation in Brazil from 
1710 onwards. We use birth decades because basic numeracy is normally acquired during the 
first decade of life (Crayen and Baten, 2009).12 Hence, every census provides us with four 
decades of numeracy values. We start to observe Brazilian numeracy in 1700 at a level of 63 
ABCC points (Figure 3). This is similar to the value of Hungary at that time and better than 
other Latin American countries like Argentina or Mexico (Manzel, Baten and Stolz 2011). 
Between 1740 and 1760, the level of numeracy increases somewhat, and remains high during 
the later period of the 18th century. The level of the 1830 birth cohort is significantly lower 
than the peak in 1790, suggesting a deterioration of human capital formation during the 
Napoleonic Wars and the following independence of Brazil in spite of being a quite peaceful 
event, by Latin American standards. This stagnation in numeracy trends can also be observed 
in other Latin American countries (Manzel, Baten and Stolz 2011). From the 1840s onwards, 
Brazil started a sustained upward trend, which accelerated between 1870 and 1910, a period 
with very high immigration rates.13 
Does this correspond to what we would have expected from Brazilian economic 
history? The eighteenth century in Portuguese America was characterized by the rise of south-
central region of the colony, thanks to the discoveries of gold in Minas Gerais and, to a lesser 
extent, Mato Grosso and Goiás. Minas Gerais was still the major producer of gold until at 
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least 1760s. The importance assumed by the gold mining led to a complete redefinition of the 
colonial economic space. The challenge to supply the mines promoted the articulation of 
regions that previously had restricted economic activities and was focused in subsistence 
production. Thus, the captaincies of the South have become producers of food and animals to 
the mines. The interior of the Northeast also turned to the supply of Minas Gerais, especially 
cattle. Hence yes, the mild increase of 18th century numeracy corresponds to the general 
development.14 
From the 1770s, this situation began to change. On the one hand, the production of 
gold in Minas Gerais (the one that remained significant in the second half of the eighteenth 
century) began a process of decline. According to statistics of collected taxes on gold by 
Wilhelm Ludwig von Eschewege the year 1771 can be considered one in which the decrease 
in revenue was found to be irreversible. Thus, the peak reached in 1754, when it was collected 
1770 kilos of gold, came to 1200 kilos in 1771, reaching 450 kilos in 1800 and 30 kilos in 
1820 (Eschwege, 1944, p. 364-369). The decline of gold was not the economic decline of the 
region, but the return to production for the domestic market, which then sustained its 
economic growth, including the continuation of significant purchases of African slaves.15 
During the 19th century, the city of Rio de Janeiro became the capital of the Empire of Brazil 
and the growth of coffee cultivation in the province of Rio de Janeiro ensured the continuity 
of economic growth in this region. In 1850, the slave trade was forbidden, which sharply 
reduced their volume to the complete disappearance after 1856.  
The decades from 1850 onwards witnessed the strong expansion of coffee plantations. 
Such economic growth was initially supported by slave labor that had accumulated in the 
region after the sharp rise in Atlantic slave trade in the last two decades it endured. Later there 
was the use of internal slave trade, with the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo 
absorbing much of the slaves from the northeastern provinces. From the last years of the 
1880s, at the end of Brazilian slavery, European immigration came up with an alternative 
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supply of labour to the strong expansion that coffee was known in its new frontier, the west of 
Sao Paulo. A positive development of numeracy is visible in Figure 3, after immigration 
replaced slave imports and interregional slave trade. 
 
Immigrant numeracy 
The immigrant data was preserved in the National Archive of Rio de Janeiro. The archive 
contains passenger lists of ships that arrived in Brazil from the beginning of the 19th century. 
However, until 1822, Portuguese immigrants were not explicitly declared as Portuguese; 
because Brazil was still part of the Portuguese empire and the Portuguese king even resided 
there after Napoleon invaded Portugal in 1808. We took samples of various arrival years 
between 1812 and 1932. The largest part of the sample stems from the period between the 
1870s to the 1920s. This is the period in which mass migration to Brazil really took off. The 
immigrants of our sample were recorded at the ports in Rio de Janeiro and Santos, which 
were the most important ports. According to Ferenczi and Willcox (1929), around 85 percent 
of all immigrants entered Brazil via those ports. Italians were the largest immigrant group, 
followed by the Portuguese, who have an exceptionally long migration history with Brazil due 
to the colonial era. Third was Spain, followed by German speaking immigrants and migrants 
from Eastern European countries. There was also some immigration from Middle Eastern 
countries during the increasingly turbulent years before and after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire (Klein, 1995). Our data set reflects this distribution quite well (Figure 4). In addition, 
the port and year of arrival, origin, ship and age were given. Numeracy estimates for 
immigrants are also arranged by birth cohorts. They show that except for Lebanese migrants, 
all immigrant groups are more numerate than native Brazilian birth cohorts (Figure 5).16 
Between 1851 and 1920, Brazil received more than 3.5 million Europeans and other 
immigrants. Of this total, 39% were Italian, 29.6% were Portuguese and Spaniards were 3.6%. 
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This volume of immigrants makes Brazil the third largest destination of European mass 
migration, behind only the United States and Argentina. 
What about the skills of European immigrants? There is a historiographic debate about 
the role of immigration in the development of the states that received the larger number of 
immigrants in Brazil (São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná and Santa Catarina). Merrick and 
Graham (1996, p. 93-4) report that Italians, for example, were predominantly recruited from 
São Paulo’s farmers in the Northern Italy, given the belief that there was a more promising 
human capital in this region. But Leff (1982, p. 69-70) argues that although the immigrants 
had better literacy levels than Brazilians, this was not a crucial factor in the role played by 
immigrants in the development of such regions. This debate remained unsolved before the 
present study, because the literacy evidence allowed both interpretations.17  
 
How path dependent is human capital formation? 
Our strategy to assess possible human capital spillovers econometrically follows a two-step 
approach. First, we investigate the impact of 1900 human capital on real GDP 2000 in a cross-
country setting. This tests our hypothesis of a long-run path dependency of human capital 
formation on economic performance of an economy as a whole. After verifying the 
relationship, we calculate a counterfactual in which we simulate a human capital situation of 
Brazil in 1900 without the immigrant‘s human capital, allowing us to compare the migration 
versus non-migration scenario. In a second step, we run a regional cross-section of immigrant 
share increase across Brazilian states on ABCC increase. The hypothesis is that the 
immigrant’s share is positively correlated with ABCC increase after controlling for other 
influences such as educational expenditures at the state level. To this end, we use data from 
the period of 1890 to 1920, the time in which Brazilian mass immigration reached its peak. 
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In the first step, our argument is that economic growth is ceteris paribus determined by 
current human capital stock, which in turn is determined by human capital in the past. This 
argument points to the direction of the work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) that 
stresses the importance of past events on economic performance today, although they focus 
on institutions rather than human capital. Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2004), disagree on the fact that institutions should be at the focus of the analysis and point to 
the importance of human capital, being a “more basic source of growth”, which in turn shaped 
institutions and brought about the path of dependency for economic development. In a more 
recent study, Prayon and Baten (2010) test this relationship with an extended data base for 
human capital. They find that it is indeed the human capital channel that enhances institutions 
which affect economic output in the very long run. Figure 6 shows the long-run relationship 
between real GDP per capita and numeracy performance in the year 1900. With the exception 
of some oil-exporting countries, we find a stable linear relationship. Those, who performed 
well in terms of human capital at the beginning of the twentieth century, are among the top-
performers a century later. 
What other variables should be of interest? Aggregate output is a function of physical 
capital, labor and human capital at a given technological level. Labor can be ignored, as we 
look at per capita values of GDP. What about physical capital? Baier, Dwyer and Tamura 
(2006) provide data on the physical capital endowment for a broad range of countries. Their 
work suggests that the levels of physical capital across world regions varied considerably in 
1900.18 Sokoloff and Engerman (2001) argue that geography and factor endowment play a 
crucial role in determining development outcomes across countries. Therefore, we include a 
set of geographical and institutional variables, such as a variable for the political system, civil 




We regress log GDP per capita on ABCC values for 90 countries in the year 1900 
(Table 1).20 The numeracy level in 1900 is highly significant. An increase in numeracy in 
1900 by one ABCC point leads to a three percent increase in GDP per capita in the year 2000. 
Institutional aspects and geography render significant results, as well. We explain around 60 
percent of the inter-country variance in real GDP with our model. Comparing Column 1 and 
2, only some 10 percent are explained by world region fixed effects. There is an unexplained 
part, as, of course; today’s economic policies and factor endowments should also play a 
crucial role in determining real GDP per capita today. Yet, we find considerable evidence for 
path dependency of human capital formation. This result implies that the countries, which had 
resolved their numeracy problem by 1900 like Norway or the US, are the states that are doing 
well in terms of economic performance in the year 2000, as well. Cases with higher GDP than 
expected are states like Indonesia, India, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt and Morocco. 
An important issue is endogeneity. It is quite likely that wealthy economies can afford 
better educational systems and therefore achieve a more rapid human capital accumulation. 
Instrumental variable techniques could be helpful, if there might be (a) potential endogeneity 
(which might be somewhat less likely, as the explanatory variable is measured 100 years 
before the dependent variable) and (b) measurement error, which can of course be a problem 
here. We included as an instrumental variable for numeracy the number of books per capita in 
the world region around 1750. Although the number of cases is quite small for this regression 
(which would increase the likelihood of insignificant coefficients), the human capital variable 
is still significant (Column 4). 
How well does our estimation perform in predicting real GDP per capita in the year 
2000 in Brazil? If we consult the Penn World Tables, we find that our estimation is quite 
close to the actual value of Brazil’s real GDP per capita in the year 2000. Whereas we would 
predict 7584.65 US$, the PWTs display an actual value of 7455.9 US$. 
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In a next step, we calculate a counter-factual to answer the question whether the 
human capital incorporated in Brazil’s immigrants had any long-term effects on Brazilian 
long-run economic performance. In 1900, the Brazilian population consisted of 17.4 million 
people. According to Klein (1995), seven percent of them were immigrants. The ABCC for 
the 1900 birth cohort of the whole population, including migrants is 89.7 percent. From our 
data, we are able to calculate the total average ABCC for immigrants, born in 1900, which 
yields 94.1 percent. This means that the average immigrant numeracy was around five 
percentage points higher than numeracy levels for the entire population. With these figures, 
we can calculate the numeracy value for native Brazilians only, conditional on their 
population share, which renders 89.3 percent. Filling this into our estimated relationship 
between ABCCs in 1900 and real GDP per capita in the year 2000, we find that average real 
income per capita would have been around 75 US $ lower, if the migrants had not come to 
Brazil and brought their numeracy skills with them. 75 US $ look like a small amount at first 
glance. How much is that worth in Brazil? 75 US $ equaled 134 Brazilian Reais in the Year 
2000.21 For comparison: the minimum wage was around 260 Reais, so this amount would 
have been roughly one half of a minimum wage. Or put differently, this equals more than the 
amount that ca. 44 million Brazilians receive with the “Fome Zero“ program, which was 
introduced in 2002 by the Brazilian president Inacio Lula da Silva. It is aimed at the very poor 
of the Brazilian society and provides them with money or coupons to buy foodstuffs. Hence, 
this money would be a modest amount in general, but still a quite significant share of real 
income to many poor Brazilians, even today. Moreover, this is a lower bound estimate, 
because first, before 1900, the gap between natives and immigrants was larger. In the early 
19th century, immigrants had an ABCC advantage over natives of around 20 percent (Figure 
5b). Second, we measured only the level effect of one generation of migrants. Third, we do 
not capture any spillover effects to native numeracy in this regression. And last but not least, 
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many events in the turbulent twentieth century certainly distorted the picture and added to the 
downward bias. 
 
Numeracy spillovers on a regional Level 
How do we measure human capital spillovers? In this case, we look at the regional 
distribution of immigration and analyze whether the immigrant increase that Brazilian states 
experienced between 1890 and 1920 is correlated with the regional ABCC-increases during 
this period. Using data from the 1890 and 1920 censuses of Brazil, we generate a regional 
distribution of the evolution in numeracy between those two points in time (Figure 7).22 This 
pattern suggests that immigration had something to do with the evolution of human capital in 
Brazil at the regional level. The biggest ABCC increases we find are in the states that were 
the main destinations for immigrants like Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais. In 
contrast, states with low immigration increase had also low ABCC increase, such as Rio 
Grande do Norte and Piauí. We now analyze whether the ABCC increases are correlated with 
regional immigrant increase over the respective period. To control for educational 
expenditures, we use the data provided by Martinéz-Fritscher, Musacchio, Viarengo (2009). 
These authors provide a very useful data base on a regional level for Brazil around the turn of 
the century. We use their data on education expenditure. Martinéz-Fritscher et al. argue that 
an improvement in education was predominantly possible in states with higher income from 
commodity exports. They further state that immigration could not have played a role, because 
the immigrants were poorly educated and the great improvement in education took place only 
after the bulk of immigrants already had entered Brazil. We do not argue that their main 
argument of commodity export taxes improving state educational expenditures does not hold, 
but we argue that states which generated such income were also states that experienced 
significant immigration, because export economies were the labor markets targeted by the 
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immigrants. Moreover, a significant proportion of European immigrants came from countries 
that already had a schooling tradition, which was reflected in literacy rates higher than those 
observed in Brazil. Finding themselves in a situation where there were no public schools, 
immigrants were involved in movements for public education or in the organization of 
networks of community-based ethnic schools (Kreutz 2007). Community schools were more 
developed in the homogeneous nuclei of national communities in the larger cities (Kreutz, 
2007). Ethnic schools were especially important for German, Italian, and Japanese 
immigrants. These national groups also had the support of their countries of origin, which 
provided educational materials and even financed the operation of many schools. In urban 
areas ethnic schools grew until the beginning of the 1920s. Later, their decline began in the 
cities of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. In the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, 
Parana and Sao Paulo, which had large concentrations of immigrants in rural communities, 
ethnic schools continued to grow until the 1930s. Hence, we argue that in states that were 
open and integrated into the world market because they had a valuable commodity to trade, 
migration also played an important part in boosting education. Both, trade and migration take 
place at the same time, because they are both characteristics of open economies.  
There is a correlation between the growth rate of education expenditures between 
1890-1920 and immigrant increase across states, the correlation coefficient is as high as 0.55 
(significant at the one percent level, p-value: 0.015) shows. In our regressions, we run the 
ABCC increase between 1890 and 1920 and between 1890 and 1950 on the log of the 
absolute immigrant increase per state (Table 2 and 3). Additionally, we control for log 
population density, because more densely populated regions might also have a better 
infrastructure to provide education to their citizens. Furthermore, we control for initial ABCC 
levels, because the more numerate the people in the state already are, the less room might be 
available for improvement, since the ABCC index is an indicator of basic human capital. Of 
course, state educational expenditures are also important in this context. We control for this in 
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two different ways, first, we take average state educational expenditures between our two time 
points and in another specification, we only control for the initial value of state expenditures 
in 1890, as the increase in this variable is correlated with the increase in immigrants 
throughout states. In our third regression, we additionally included a set of dummy variables 
that control for certain export commodities like coffee, cattle and cotton or mate.  
We ran three different specifications, where we varied the measures of educational 
expenditures of the states and additionally included the export industry dummy variables. 
Throughout all specifications, the log of immigrant increase in the states has a significant 
effect of substantial and robust magnitude. If we calculate standardized beta coefficients, the 
effect is the most important in the first two specifications.23 None of the commodity 
expenditure dummies becomes significant. The log of population density is only significant in 
the first two specifications, whereas the initial ABCC level is always significantly and 
negatively correlated with the ABCC increase of the respective state, a result we would have 
expected. To test the robustness of these results, we ran the same regression on the ABCC 
increase between 1890 and 1950 across states (Table 3). The results stay robust; immigrants 
seem to have produced an impact on human capital development across Brazilian states.24 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we studied the long-term human capital formation in Brazil. We constructed a 
numeracy trend for Brazil that extends back to the beginning of the 18th century. With a new 
sample on human capital endowment of 19th century mass migrants, we showed that 
international migration had a positive effect on the stock of human capital in Brazil. Looking 
at regional data for Brazil, we showed that human capital spillovers took place predominantly 
in those states that received the most migration in absolute numbers. Increases in numeracy 
are significantly positively correlated with immigration, even after controlling for educational 
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expenditures on the state level. This suggests that human capital grew strongest in those states 
where most immigrants arrived. Could there be crowding-out effects in a way that Brazilians 
do not have education incentives, because the education-intensive jobs are increasingly filled 
with immigrants? We actually found no evidence for this theoretical possibility. Human 
capital intensive migration in contrast might stimulate firm creation and also provide teachers 
and institutions to provide education even for native Brazilians.  
We also found that a modestly sized, but appreciable significantly positive effect of 
this improvement of the human capital stock on economic performance persists until today. 
Hence, human capital in its various dimensions incorporated in international migrants can 
affect human capital endowment, which in turn determines economic development and 
performance of destination countries. This relationship is crucial in understanding today’s 
human capital selective immigration policies of major immigrant countries like the US, the 
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Figure 1: Numeracy 1900 versus higher educational attainment to total population in the 























































































Figure 2: Higher educational attainment 2000 (Barro and Lee, 2000) as a major determinant 
























































































































































































































1772 Sorocaba 1772 Sorocaba adj. 1830 PA, MG, SP




Data: Author’s calculations, sources, see text 
Note: We looked at the Sorocaba district in the later, 1830 evidence, containing data on slaves 
and free people and we calculated the difference of slave and free ABCC levels, weighted by 
the number of observations. With this value, we corrected the Sorocaba 1772 evidence to 
make it comparable to our other sources. 
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Author’s calculations. Data from archival records of the National Archive in Rio de Janeiro 
and http://www.an.gov.br/sian/inicial.asp. MEN stands for immigrants that were listed to be 
“arabe”, “ottoman”, “orient”, “oriental” with no source country more specifically given. 
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Data: ABCCs: Crayen and Baten 2009, Prayon and Baten 2010, Log immigrant increase: 
Annuario estatistico do Brazil 1908-1912. Rio de Janeiro: Directoria Geral de Estatistica, v. 1-




Table 1: Long term impact of human capital formation on economic performance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Numeracy in 1990 0.029*** 0.039*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Democracy   0.020  
   (0.293)  
Longitude   0.003  
   (0.281)  
Latitude   0.011*  
   (0.082)  
Landlocked   0.295  
   (0.244)  
Civil War   -0.504*** -0.676** 
   (0.004) (0.028) 
Oil   0.028 0.126* 
   (0.552) (0.061) 
World region fixed 
effects NO YES YES NO 
     
Constant 6.314*** 5.210*** 6.155*** 6.153*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 90 90 53 22 
R-squared 0.294 0.408 0.663 0.593 
 
Notes: robust p-values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Oil defined as log of barrel per 1000 population (Source: "Oil reserves (per capita) by country", CIA 
World Factbook, 28 July 2005. Retrieved from  
http://www.NationMaster.com/graph/ene _oil _res _percap-energy-oil-reserves-per-capita) 
Civil War is 1 if a country experienced a violent inner-country conflict with 1000+ battle deaths during 
the last 50 years (Source: COW) 
In Column 4, numeracy in 1900 is instrumented with books per capita in 1750 (Source: Baten and van 
Zanden 2008).  
For books per capital, some country values are interpolated: for Southeast Asia the value of Indonesia 
is assumed,  





Table 2: Regional regressions of ABCC increase 1890-1920 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log absolute immigrant increase 1.15*** 1.58*** 0.98* 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.084) 
Log population density 1.46*** 1.19** -0.37 
 (0.009) (0.045) (0.867) 
Initial ABCC -0.52*** -0.63*** -0.59*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
Average educational expenditure 4.96***  8.20** 
 (0.009)  (0.046) 
Commodity export: cattle   6.48 
   (0.151) 
Commodity export: coffee   2.47 
   (0.660) 
Commodity export: cotton   4.68 
   (0.174) 
Commodity export: mate   3.99 
   (0.344) 
Commodity export: rubber   -6.16 
   (0.425) 
Commodity export: sugar   6.02 
   (0.367) 
Commodity export: tobacco   0.00 
   (.) 
Initial education expenditure in 1890  3.41*  
  (0.063)  
Constant 16.80* 29.22*** 31.64* 
 (0.059) (0.006) (0.090) 
Observations 19 19 19 
R-squared 0.85 0.83 0.89 
Robust in parentheses    





Table 3: Robustness-test – do the results hold also for the 1890 - 1950 ABCC increase? 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log absolute immigrant increase 1.19*** 1.65*** 1.02* 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.084) 
Log population density 1.52*** 1.24** -0.38 
 (0.009) (0.045) (0.867) 
Initial ABCC -0.50*** -0.62*** -0.57** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
Average educational expenditure 5.17***  8.55** 
 (0.009)  (0.046) 
Commodity export: cattle   6.75 
   (0.151) 
Commodity export: coffee   2.57 
   (0.660) 
Commodity export: cotton   4.88 
   (0.174) 
Commodity export: mate   4.15 
   (0.344) 
Commodity export: rubber   -6.41 
   (0.425) 
Commodity export: sugar   6.28 
   (0.367) 
Commodity export: tobacco   0.00 
   (.) 
Initial education expenditure  3.55*  
  (0.063)  
Constant 17.50* 30.43*** 32.96* 
 (0.059) (0.006) (0.090) 
Observations 19 19 19 
R-squared 0.84 0.82 0.89 
Robust in parentheses    




Internet Appendix: Methodology and basic concepts of age heaping 
 
Numeracy is an important component of overall human capital. In order to provide estimates 
of its basic components, we apply the age-heaping methodology.25 The idea underlying this 
methodology is that traditionally in underdeveloped countries when census takers, army 
recruitment officers, or prison officials asked an individual to state his or her exact age only a 
certain number were able to do so, the others rounding theirs off -- for example, to 40, when, 
in fact, the correct answer was 39 or 41. In today’s world of mandatory schooling, passports, 
universities, birth documents, and bureaucracy, it is hard to imagine such a situation, but it 
prevailed before the modern era, in less information-oriented ones than ours. The typical 
result of age heaping is an age distribution with spikes at ages ending in a five or a zero and 
an underrepresentation of other ages, creating a distortion of the true age distribution. The fact 
that there was also some heaping on multiples of two, especially among children and 
teenagers and to a lesser extent young adults, indicates that most undereducated individuals 
knew their age as teenagers but had lost the ability to recall or calculate it by the time they 
reached adulthood.26  
The 1790 Mexico City census offers an example of rounding off to multiples of five, 
recording as it does 410 people aged 40, but only 42 aged 41: clearly an example of age 
heaping. Apolant (1975, 333) offers some particular examples: for instance, Joseph Milan, 
appearing in February 1747 as a witness in an Uruguayan court, was 48 years old according to 
one judicial record, but declared himself (in the same year) to be 45 in another. Such 
misreporting is a problem for demographers trying to calculate life expectancies and other 
population statistics, but, paradoxically, it is thanks to age heaping that we can extrapolate 
numeracy rates in various populations over the course of history.  
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The ratio between the preferred ages and the others can be calculated by means of any 
number of indices, the Whipple index being considered the most reliable.27 The number of 
persons in a given census reporting a rounded age ending in 0 or 5 is divided by the total 
number of persons in the census, and this sum is then multiplied by 500. Thus the index 
measures the percentage of those who state an age ending in a five or zero, assuming that each 


















For an easier interpretation, A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2010) suggested another index, 
which we call the ABCC index.29 It is a simple linear transformation of the Whipple index 












ABCC  if 100≥Wh ; else 100=ABCC . 
This share turns out to be closely correlated with other measures of human capital, such as 
literacy and schooling, at the local level, nationwide, and over various spans of time (Bachi 
1951, Myers 1954, Mokyr 1983, A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen 2010). A’Hearn, Baten, and 
Crayen (2010) found that after 1950 there was a close correlation in less developed countries 
(LDCs) between illiteracy and age heaping. They calculated the rates of age heaping and 
illiteracy among approximately 270,000 individuals representing 416 regions, ranging from 
Latin America to Oceania.30 The correlation coefficient with illiteracy was high: 0.7. The 
correlation with the PISA results for mathematical abilities was even higher: 0.85; this means 




In addition, A'Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2010) also used a large US-census sample to 
perform a very detailed analysis of this relationship, subdividing the sample according to race, 
gender, and educational status, among other criteria. In each case, they obtained a statistically 
significant relationship. It is worth noting that the samples' coefficients are quite stable: that 
is, a unit change in age heaping is associated with similar changes in literacy across the 
various tests. The results are valid not only for the US but also for all of those countries in 
which age heaping has been found to occur, the correlation there, as in the US, being both 
statistically and economically significant.  
In order to assess the robustness of those US-census results and the similar 
conclusions drawn from late-20th-century LDCs, A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2010) also 
assessed age heaping and literacy in 16 European countries between the Middle Ages and the 
early 19th century. Again, they found a positive correlation between age heaping and literacy, 
although the relationship was somewhat weaker than for the 19th or 20th century data. It is 
likely that the unavoidable measurement error when using early modern data caused the lower 
statistical significance. 
Age-heaping data have also been have been compared with other human capital 
indicators, such as primary-education rates. To date the broadest such geographical sample 
studied is one designed by Crayen and Baten (2009): age-heaping and schooling data (and 
other explanatory variables as well) from 70 countries. They found in a series of cross-
sections between the 1880s and the 1940s that primary schooling and age heaping were 
closely correlated, with R-squares between 0.55 and 0.76 (including other control variables; 
see below). Again, the coefficients were quite stable over time.  
This large sample also made it possible for us to examine other potential determinants 
of age heaping. To assess whether the extent of bureaucracy, birth registration, and 
government interaction with citizens are predictors of whether an individual knows his or her 
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own exact age, (i.e., is numerate) they used the number of censuses performed in a given 
country during the period under study as an explanatory variable for its age-heaping rate. 
Except for countries with a very long history of census-taking, all variations of this variable 
turned out insignificant, which would suggest that an independent bureaucracy effect was 
rather weak. In other words, it is sometimes the case that societies with a high number of 
censuses had high age awareness. But, at the same time, these societies were also early in 
introducing schooling and this variable clearly had more explanatory power in a joint 
regression than the independent bureaucracy effect. In addition, using height as well as per 
capita GDP as a proxy for welfare, Crayen and Baten also determined that the effect of the 
standard of living on age-heaping rates varies considerably, being significant in some 
decades, insignificant in others. Cultural determinants of age heaping were were considerable 
in East Asia but not in the Latin American countries under study in this article.  
In order to apply the ABCC age-heaping index to several countries and birth decades, 
we use the age groups 23-32, 33-42, etc.31 We omit the age range from 63 to 72 because it 
provides an insufficient number of observations, especially in the case of the 17th and 18th 
centuries, when mortality was higher than in subsequent centuries.32  
An advantage of the age-heaping methodology is that age statements are more widely 
available than other human capital proxies, such as signature ability or school attendance. As 
Reis (2008) argues, age heaping is a very basic measure of human capital. It is therefore 
especially useful in the study of human capital development in Latin America during the 17th 
and 18th centuries, when more advanced human capital indicators were quite scarce and 
instead of offering insights into a broad spectrum of a given population provided only a 
limited one, of the socioeconomic elite.  
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1 The „Fome Zero“ program was introduced 2002, by President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. It assists ca. 44 
million Brazilians with monthly payments between 50 and 95 Brazilian Reais to amend their nutrition 
expenditures. In Brazil, nowadays the share of people living from less than 1$ per day is well over 20 percent. 
2 For source countries, emigration of highly skilled individuals, the phenomenon of a brain drain, can be 
problematic, however the possibility of migration might also induce further investment in human capital and 
therefore affect factor endowment positively. Beine et al. (2008), Stark et al. (1997), and Bruecker and Defoort 
(2006) conclude that effects on the source country’s human capital endowment are ambiguous.  
How was the brain drain situation in the Brazilian cas? Stolz and Baten (2011) found that typically most 
migrants had numeracy levels in the middle between European source country and Brazilian destination levels of 
natives. Hence there was probably not such a brain drain for the source countries.  
3 The question is whether the immigrants are substitutes or complements to the native population, because this 
determines if there will be a crowding out of natives on the labor market, or migrants’ skill composition is 
complement natives so that growth effects can be realized (Borjas 1994). 
4
CGE models have the advantage that possible internal migration due to international immigration can be 










However, Martinéz-Fritscher, Musacchio and Viarengo (2009) argue that the increase in human capital in the 
period 1890-1940 cannot be explained by European immigration, because these migrants were among the least 
educated in Europe. Still, they do not provide data on immigrant selectivity. In our data, selectivity shows a 
mixed picture. Whereas migrants from Latin America, southern European countries and Syria were mainly 
positively selected in terms of numeracy from the source country population, US-Americans and Western 
Europeans were less numerate than their compatriots at home. Moreover, the education of some of the immigrant 
nationalities might have even exceeded their home countries’ average. Portuguese immigration, the second most 
important national group arriving in Brazil in the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century, is an 
example in line. Using passport registers generated in Portugal, some studies showed that emigrants were more 















The census contains information at the household level. All household members were asked for their names and 
ages, and there is information if they actually belonged to the family or were “agregados”. This word refers to 
people who were like servants in pre-industrial rural Northern Europe. They were free, lived in the master's 
household, performed a wide range of services, and received board and lodging, and sometimes also some 
money. Furthermore, the census provides information on the possessions of a household. 
9 This work was developed by the team coordinated by researchers Clotilde Andrade Paiva, Roberto Borges 
Martins and Maria do Carmo Salazar Martins, who kindly allowed us to use their database. Some results reached 
with the use of this material can be found in Paiva (1986, 1996), Paiva and Arnaut (1990), Rodarte (2008), 
Andrade (2001). 
0
All of the published volumes of these censuses can be found in the digital library of the Brazilian bureau of 
statistics (http://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/). 

Using data from Juif and Baten we find that numeracy was even lower in the northern parts of Brazil than in 
the southeast. However, this difference was statistically significant only without controlling for accusation and 
gender. With these controls included, southeastern numeracy was not significantly different from that in the 
north. A reason for this may be that many Jews, with higher levels of human capital, fled to the southern pioneer 
regions whilst women tended to aggregate in the capitals of the north. The total sample size of the Portuguese 
inquisition cases with age statements is N=10316, but the number of Brazilian individuals is only around five 
percent of that number (N=493). Nevertheless, the authors recently showed that even quite small sample sizes 
yield surprisingly accurate results (Juif and Baten 2011). 
12 We only use the age ranges of the 23-62 year olds, to avoid age effects caused by selective mortality of the 
older age groups. 
We made one exception for the 1750s birth cohort, represented by the 63-72 year-olds for the 1830 nominative 
list in the Southeast, because we were curious whether the higher ABCC level of the 1830s compared to the 
1772 was caused by selectivity, or by an increase between 1740s and 1760s. Given that the birth cohort of the 
1750s falls almost exactly between the 1740s and the 1760s values, this might be an indication of an increase of 
ABCC during this period. 
13 The geographical, gender and ethnic distribution of human capital was, however, extremely unequal in Brazil. 
Colonial legacy had produced a society with a very unequal distribution of income and human capital (Sokoloff 
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and Engerman 2000, Fritscher et al. 2009). Thus, one has to keep in mind that numeracy levels for slaves or 
women or people from rural areas are far lower than those of city dwellers and white or upper class men. 
14 At the same time, the sugar-producing regions in the northeast (Bahia and Pernambuco, especially) 
had been suffering a steady decline in market share of the Atlantic sugar, mainly a result of competition from the 
West Indies sugar. The opening of the mines made the situation even more delicate to the sugar areas since they 
started to compete in the transatlantic slave trade with the mining proprietors. However, throughout the 
eighteenth century sugar was the main product of the Brazilian export basket. 

To a review of the debate about this question, see Bergad 1999.
5
The Portuguese continued to predominate in the migratory flow to the second half of the 1870s, followed by 
the Germans. From 1876, there was a strong increase in Italian immigration that began to dispute the primacy 
with the Portuguese. From 1882 the Italians have dominated the main migratory flow, which will expand in 
subsequent years until 1903. Thereafter, the Portuguese again predominate. The Spaniards formed the third 
largest group, with significant participation especially in the years 1889 to 1897 and from 1904 to 1917. The 
Germans also formed a significant group, especially in the 1880s, and from 1890 to 1908. It should be noted as 
the beginning of Japanese immigration from 1908, but which has taken over significant amounts only after the 
First World War. 
8
For a panoramic and more recent view of this discussion in Brazil, see Fausto (1999), Bassanezi et alli (2008).
18 In a regression of GDP 2000 on physical and human capital in the year 1900, which is possible only for a 
number of 23 countries, both determinants are, of course, highly significant. We tested this with the human 
capital indicator incorporated in the Baier et al. (2006) data set and also with our numeracy estimates. 



































http://www.brasilien.li/artikel/wechselkurs-real-euro-1980, last accessed March 24, 2011.
&&
The ABCC levels in 1890 are smallest for north-eastern Brazilian states like Alagoas or Sergipe. Rio Grande 
do Sul and Santa Catarina display very high numeracy values in 1890. Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are 
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situated somewhere in the middle. In 1920, however, these primary immigrant destinations display the highest 
numeracy values, together with the southern states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul
23 If we include the set of export dummy variables, the beta coefficient of average education expenditure 
becomes larger than the one on immigrants. 
24 We could also have imagined that were changes in the number of days worked, but the changes were actually 
quite modest. Until the political independence of Brazil in 1822, the holidays were linked to the Catholic 
worship. Sundays were kept as holy days, when Catholic Church recommended not working. However, slaves 
were allowed by their masters to take advantage of this day to work for themselves, cultivating pieces of land, 
fishing, hunting or selling their products. Religious people had always condemned the practice, asking the slave 
owners to appoint other days for the slaves were dedicated to their own work. However, the reiteration of these 
claims indicates that the slaves who could took advantage of Sunday to work on their own. [About these 
practices see, among others, Schwartz, 1992, Slenes, 1999.]  
In addition to Sundays, Brazil had an extensive religious calendar that was observed as days of rest. There were 
about 10 religious days observed by all (Holy Week, Corpus Christi, St. Anthony, St. John, Assumption, All 
Souls, All Saints, Immaculate Conception, Christmas), and other holy days that could be observed only locally, 
as the day of the patron saints of the parish or other saints worshiped there. In addition, there were the occasional 
celebrations related to the royal family, the arrival of governors and bishops, and the festivities of "particular 
character" as baptisms, birthdays and blessings of mills (Breu, 1976). Therefore, it is plausible to consider that 
there were at least 20 days per year considered as holidays in colonial period. 
After the political independence of Brazil in 1822, new dates have been introduced as civic holidays. During the 
First Empire (1822-1831), for example, there was the commemoration of March 25 (oath of the Constitution), 
April 7 (abdication of Pedro I), September 7 (Independence Day), December 2 (birth of Pedro II) and others 
(Basile, 2006). Later, other days were added to the civic calendar. While those days were mainly observed in 
urban areas, they added new holidays for a significant portion of Brazil, making the total number of days without 
work arisen to about thirty days a year.
25 For more detailed surveys on the age-heaping methodology see A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2010). 
26 At more advanced ages this heaping pattern tends to be negligible, but is, interestingly, somewhat more 
prevalent among populations sufficiently numerate not to round off ages to multiples of five. 
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27 A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2010) found that this is the only index that fulfils the desired properties of scale 
independence (a linear response to the degree of heaping) and that it offers a reliable ranking of samples among 
which the degree of heaping varies. 
28 A value of 500 means an age distribution with ages ending only in multiples of five, whereas 100 indicates no 
such heaping patterns on multiples of five: in other words, 20% of the population reported an age ending in a 
multiple of five.  
29 The name results from the initials of the authors’ last names plus Greg Clark’s, who suggested this in a 
comment on their paper. Whipple indexes below 100 are normally caused by random variation of birth rates in 
the 20th century rich countries. They are not carrying important information, hence normally set to 100 in the 
ABCC index. 
30 See A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2010). Appendix available from the authors. 
31 This method has two advantages: it spreads the preferred ages, such as 25 or 30, more evenly within the age 
groups; and it adjusts for the fact that more persons will be alive at age 50 than at age 54 and at age 55 than at 
age 59 (Crayen and Baten 2010). 
32 Given that adults aged 23 to 32 round on multiples of two as well as five, we use the adjustment method 
suggested by Crayen and Baten (2010) to increase the Whipple value (minus 100) by 24% before calculating the 
ABCC value. 
